These generals need to be divided into two groups. There is in one camp, possibly all by himself, the foolish "realist" General Zinni. He is, along with Powell's aide Lawrence Wilkerson, a closet or not-so-closet appeaser of Islam, and just as Wilkerson has claimed that we cannot now "leave" Iraq because we would have to "return a few years later with five million men," Zinni cannot conceive of leaving Iraq now because he is of the "we broke it, we fix it" school -- he wants us there. He doesn't want the Americans to leave in order to deal more forcefully with Iran, and to turn their attention to other theaters of the Jihad -- most importantly, Western Europe where the Infidels must be supported -- or those who recognize the problem must be supported -- in their campaign to halt and reverse islamization.

There may be others among those generals who cannot see that the problem is not mainly Rumsfeld. He may be limited -- though by some accounts it was Rumsfeld who did not like the Light Unto the Muslim Nations project and wanted to leave Iraq soon -- in other words, Rumsfeld who was forced to go along with this ridiculous messianic mission that is a sign of timidity, a substitute for coming to grips with the world-wide problem of Jihad and of Islam itself. Rumsfeld virtually alone has never been guilty of vaporings about wonderful Islam, and his own worry over the constant replenishment of terrorist recruits show that he is getting at least some idea of the problem.

This is not meant as a complete defense of his actions. He should have insisted, and he should be insisting now, on an American withdrawal, and on getting ready to watch the spectacle of ethnic and sectarian fissures within Iraq have effects -- effects Infidels should welcome -- beyond the borders of Iraq. And then he should be setting up policy-planning committees defined geographically -- black Africa, Western Europe, Eastern Europe (they differ in their susceptibility to Islam), Latin America. And those assigned to such policy-planning committees should have one goal: the weakening of Islam, of its internal coherence, and of its appeal to Infidels, beginning with the psychically and economically marginal, but also its appeal simply to the ignorant among the Infidels.

Rumsfeld's problems are not tactical. They are the problems that all of those, ignorant of Islam, and ignorant of Iraq, brought upon themselves -- and that certainly includes, in the first place, the President, who appears to be the truest believer in the Light Unto the Muslim Nations Project, because he cannot allow himself to conceive of any other way to act.