dear sir:

if i understand your post correctly, you criticize pamela geller's efforts to broaden the scope of the bary case via the rally to be held in columbus on 16 november, and suggest that people more cautiously just back the legal team's efforts to obtain a ruling from the court that rifqa bary is a dependent child, so that more appropriate remedies to secure her safety, and permanent separation from her parents, might be sought by the child obtaining a certain immigration status, e.g., the "green card", and thereby gain that separation.

i think your criticism of ms. geller’s aims unwarranted, and believe it to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of certain aspects of dependency law.  if i may explain my perspective after 25 years of law practice, 10 or 12 of which were spent in juvenile courts and more specifically in juvenile courts.—

the simplest question before the franklin county (ohio) juvenile court is whether rifqa bary is in fact and under the law a dependent child, e.g., is she a child whose parents cannot adequately provide for and  protect whether because they are neglectful, abusive or simply unwilling to perform the minimum tasks of parenting.  it would appear to me that rifqa bary makes a colorable assertion of parental abuse, by her allegations of the threats to do her harm issuing from her father, and by the fact that the court records so far sustain a parental confirmation of the circumstances in which rifqa asserts those threats to have occurred.

it is likely that the ohio court will find rifqa to be a dependent child.

the matter does not end there.  the matter simply starts there.  and, the remedies that the court issues & orders while the case is pending until its conclusion will determine the extent to which rifqa bary’s life is protected and supervised by the state, or, on the other hand, the extent to which she is exposed to abuse, assault and the very probable exposure to death by the hands of family because of her apostasy.

for instance.—

a dependency court has the jurisdiction to order a child returned to home even in the face of find dependency.

a dependency court, on the other hand, has the authority to order a child into a custodial situation outside the home, which would be closely supervised by the court, and by the appropriate child protections service either in the county or as provided by the state.  a dependency court has the authority to prohibit visitation by parents and family, or to limit it to a matter of hours per episode and in the company of a social worker, or to limit it to daylight hours of a limited frequency.   a dependency court can order an extremely thorough and detailed home study, can order parents to undergo psychiatric evaluation, and to comply with any treatment recommendations issuing from such evaluation:  the court can task the appropriate social agencies to measure and report upon parental compliance.

to the point of this letter.—

imagine, if you will, a case in which a child of christian fundamentalist parents is abused by those parents.  imagine, further, that a source of the strain in family relations is a child’s refusal to take part in religious ceremonies involving the handling of rattlesnakes, fully loaded with venom and fangs intact.

would competent counsel simply seek a determination of “dependency” from a court, and not resist the child’s return to the home.  would competent counsel not seek to introduce the facts and circumstances of parental efforts to compel a child to take part in the rattlesnake handling portions of the parent’s religious ceremonies.

competent counsel would not hold the scope of the hearing to just the barest issues of dependency, but would seek to get the evidence of these ceremonies in, so that the appropriate temporary orders securing the safety of the child would be ensured.  in short, competent counsel would seek to broaden the examination of the court to include a thorough review of all such relevant facts and circumstances.

i believe, therefore, your criticisms of ms. geller to be entirely misplaced, both because you do not understand why she seeks to make sure the courts examine the issues of apostasy in the islamic religion, and to make sure that the courts understand the very true extent of the physical danger presented to her by any association with her family.

those speakers invited to the rally are designed to do exactly that, and to make the public aware of these issues.

the very real danger presented to rifqa bary is not that the ohio court will not find that she is a dependent child, but, that the ohio court, being and remaining ignorant of the facts and circumstances of apostasy killings and murders, will not fashion those intermediate remedies necessary during the pendency of the case to adequately protect rifqa bary.

the court must be educated about islamic and koranic penalties to be imposed upon apostates who do not reaffirm their adherence to islam.

the court must be educated and understand that if rifqa bary is returned to her family or placed in their immediate company, that she faces the fate of an apostate, and that she is exposed to the risk that she will be spirited out of the country with them to sri lanka, a place where her “justice” might be “meted” out by islam and her family without intervention on the part of the civil and criminal authorities.

this is the function of this rally.  and, if it “invites” the intervention of the islamic community, … , well, good sirs, if we are to stand for our heritage and our beliefs, how is that to be avoided from time to time.  would you see us abandon our beliefs, abandon the field to islam, at the mere risk of risk, as it were.  that is a callow position.

finally, pamela geller is as aware as you of the “green card” situation with immigration services.  but, in and of itself, it is absolutely no panacea for rifqa bary, and presents absolutely no protection to her if she is in the presence of her family.  it is a remedy to be sought in conjunction with the other protections sought for her in a dependency proceeding, but the only underlying protection to her is that derived from being separate from her family.

john jay, milton freewater, oregon  usa

Actually, Mr. Gordon, it was my understanding that Ms. Bary hadn't been in contact with any of her friends.  Your opinion is that her ability to communicate is not restricted, but the evidence is that she has not done so.  How do you know this?

Best,

GeoffP

Hi there,

The op wrote:

Her cell phone is not tapped, and she can phone whom she chooses.

Her internet access is not restricted to approved sites, or officially monitored by anyone

Where exactly are you getting this information from please? Who is your source? I ask because as far as I and many other people are aware, Rifqa IS being restricted.

People are very concerned about Rifqa. Could you at least reassure us by confirming your source please.

Many thanks