Total Victory or Nothing: Israel’s Gaza Imperative

by Sammy Stein (October 2025)

 

If the Gaza war were to end tomorrow, would Israel tolerate a situation in which Hamas retains military control over the Strip, mirroring the way Hezbollah dominated Lebanon prior to its recent war with Israel? This is not a hypothetical scenario. It is a genuine risk. And it is one Israel must resolutely reject, regardless of who proposes it or how diplomatically appealing it may appear.

Hamas’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire stems from more than just obstinacy. It is a calculated strategic choice. The group seeks to emerge from this war bloodied but unbroken, with its terror army intact and its political dominance over Gaza preserved. And to achieve that, it is signalling a willingness to accept the kind of governance facade that until recently enabled Hezbollah to flourish unchecked in Lebanon, a structure where a weak, internationally recognised civilian administration existed merely to placate the global community, while a terrorist militia controls everything that matters.

Such a model would allow Hamas, a proscribed terrorist organisation, to regroup, rearm, and reignite its war against Israel at a time of its choosing. Worse, it would give Hamas the perverse satisfaction of claiming that it committed the most horrific mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust and survived to tell the tale by re-establishing itself as Gaza’s rulers with the approval of the international community.

Despite not having completed its military campaign to dismantle Hamas, Israel is already witnessing proposals for Gaza’s future. Some suggest transferring political control to the Palestinian Authority via a temporary government of technocrats. Others, including some within Israel and the wider international community, promote the idea of a regional Arab coalition assuming control of the Strip. At first glance, these suggestions appear acceptable, but in reality, they carry grave risks.

What all these ideas have in common is their resemblance to the recent Lebanese model, where Hezbollah operated as the real power behind the scenes, rendering the Lebanese government a mere diplomatic fig leaf.

At a summit in Cairo meant to propose alternatives to Donald Trump’s plan for the Gaza Riviera, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi reaffirmed his opposition to displacing Palestinians, voiced support for an independent Palestinian state and proposed the establishment of an administrative committee made up of independent states to temporarily manage Gaza and oversee the flow of international aid, ostensibly until the Palestinian Authority could return.

Egypt also floated a broader vision of an interim governance by a coalition of Arab, Muslim, and Western states. But crucially, it provided no detail on how Hamas would be sidelined, how reconstruction would be funded, or how power would be transferred without strengthening Hamas’s grip.

Unsurprisingly, Hamas has welcomed such proposals. In December 2024, it reportedly accepted an Egyptian initiative to form a joint Palestinian committee to govern Gaza after the current conflict. Hamas claimed to have consulted with Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other factions, promoting the idea of “Palestinian unity.” In February 2025, Arab media reported that Hamas was prepared to hand formal control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority, supposedly under Egyptian pressure and as part of negotiations for a ceasefire and hostage release. Yet Israeli officials swiftly dismissed this as a ploy, with a spokesman for Prime Minister Netanyahu declaring that such a scenario is “not going to happen.”

These declarations from Hamas are not signs of moderation or compromise. They are tactical deceptions aimed at retaining power under a different banner. Hamas has no intention of surrendering control over Gaza. It would be only too happy to hide behind a nominally independent administration while it reconstitutes its forces, replenishes its arsenal and resumes preparations for another round of violence.

This strategy closely mirrors that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Prior to Israel’s recent military campaign, Hezbollah exercised complete dominance over Lebanese security policy, held de facto veto power over the government, ran its own shadow state within Shiite communities and possessed military capabilities far superior to those of the Lebanese Armed Forces. It operated its own command structure, stockpiled weapons with Iran’s assistance and used the Lebanese government as a shield against international pressure.

With Hezbollah’s infrastructure recently seriously damaged by Israel, the Lebanese government has taken tentative steps toward reclaiming sovereignty by confiscating terror-linked funds at Beirut airport and cracking down on suspicious Iranian flights but real control remains elusive.

The danger for Israel is clear. If Hamas will be able to hide behind an internationally endorsed puppet regime, this would leave Israel diplomatically constrained. Any future Israeli action in Gaza, even if targeted at terrorist elements, would provoke international outrage for violating the “sovereignty” of a supposedly legitimate administration. But this sovereignty would be illusory.

The consequences of such an outcome would be catastrophic. Hamas would immediately begin rearming, using the ceasefire to smuggle weapons, rebuild its tunnel networks and re-establish its rocket systems. With Iranian funding and technical support, the group could rapidly recover its military strength under the protective cloak of an internationally approved governing body. This is precisely how Hezbollah built its powerbase in Lebanon, while Israel was left hamstrung by international pressure.

There should be no illusions about Hamas’s intent. Its leaders have repeatedly declared their desire to destroy Israel. They have made clear that they are prepared to sacrifice countless Palestinian lives in pursuit of this objective. Whether 50,000 or 100,000 civilians die as “martyrs” is irrelevant to them. What matters is the jihad against the Jewish state.

Faced with such a threat, Israel has no option but to continue its operations until Hamas’s military and political infrastructure is fully dismantled. Nothing less than total victory will suffice.

Two core objectives must be achieved for any viable post-war plan.

 

• First, Israel must eliminate Hamas’s command structure, leadership and armed forces. If Hamas survives in any meaningful form, it will continue to rule Gaza, regardless of what title appears on the office door. The people of Gaza will not support any future peaceful vision if Hamas remains a shadow authority, armed and ready to strike again.
• Second, Israel must establish long-term security control over Gaza, including full operational freedom for the IDF. Any post-war governance model must allow Israel to conduct counterterrorism operations across Gaza, without restriction. This would resemble the situation in Area A of the West Bank, where the IDF regularly operates to disrupt terror activity. Only by maintaining full security access, by land, air, and sea, will Israel be able to prevent the resurgence of Hamas or the emergence of other Iranian-backed militias.

 

Once these objectives are secured, and only then, should Israel and its allies begin exploring models of limited Palestinian autonomy. Ideally, this would involve moderate regional partners such as the Gulf States and be underwritten by U.S. support. But such a solution must be built on ironclad security guarantees for Israel.

Any plan that fails to meet these basic criteria is not a peace plan. It is a recipe for another war.

 

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Sammy Stein was born a Jewish Palestinian, a description that causes much confusion with people. In 1948, he and all other Jewish Palestinians living in Palestine became Israeli citizens. He now lives in Glasgow and has two daughters, two grandchildren, and is married to Vicci. Sammy is Chair of Glasgow Friends of Israel, which celebrated its tenth anniversary in May 2025.

 

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