By Bruce Gilley
Having asserted its imperial interests in Venezuela, the United States now finds itself in the inevitable transition to a more colonial occupation. The country cannot be left to its own devices in the post-Maduro era, which would lead to a reborn Chavismo regime or a civil war. But getting colonialism right in Venezuela requires a focus on five key objectives, all of which are within the capabilities of the United States.
First, the aim of any occupation regime is to rebuild a legitimate new political order. Every other goal, economic, political, or security, needs to be subordinated to this task. Elections will probably be needed. The oil industry needs to be revived. But none of that should be done in a manner that makes Venezuelans see the new order as something apart from themselves. National ownership of the reconstruction process is key. As I wrote in 2014 for a National Defense University publication, once the “external agenda” that drives an intervention is over, the “internal agenda” of relegitimation comes to the fore.
Secondly, of all the goals needed for legitimacy, rebuilding state institutions will be key. This was a key focus of the new civil affairs designations in U.S. military that were created in the wake of Iraq by the Institute for Military Support to Governance at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. Those designations, which I contributed to, recognize the centrality of building up institutions (the civil service, the courts, police, local governments) to a successful occupation.
Third, there is no rush. A broad, transitional government created from a cross-section of ancien regime, opposition, and local elites is sufficient to govern the country under the existing constitution in the interim. Rushing into elections or sending in external governors of the political system or the oil industry would be damaging.
Fourth, the Trump administration needs to get its messaging right on what is happening in Venezuela. Like every U.S. intervention from the Korea to Iraq, what began as an imperial police action has now become a colonial project. And the U.S. has an excellent record on colonialism, despite the cavils of critics. Our intention, as in Japan, Germany, the Philippines and Iraq, is to leave behind a legitimate political order that will benefit the local population. We can use fudge words like “external governance” or “shared sovereignty”, but the mission should be clear.
Finally, Washington needs to be realistic about what will result. We should not expect Venezuela to become a close U.S. ally, and we should not expect the majority of Venezuelans to welcome this external irruption into their national history. A successful mission is one that rebuilds Venezuelan support for the political community and institutions at home, not one that turns the country into a U.S. ally. Yankee Go Home! will come soon enough, and that’s OK. It will signal success.
Bruce Gilley is professor of politics and global affairs at Portland State University and the author of The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy.
Photograph from the Latin America Travel Association.
2 Responses
I agreed with this professor until I got here:
“We should not expect Venezuela to become a close U.S. ally. . . ”
Why not? We defeated Japan, rebuilt their country and their institutions and even now Japan is a great ally. Similar occurred in Germany. We liberated Venezuala from their dictator – we will help them rebuild their institutions and their economy all of which were ruined by the dictator and his cronies. Why would it be an unreasonable expectation for Venezuela to be both appreciative and a “close U.S. ally?”
Venezuela should absolutely become a close US ally, if they do not, the mission is not successful.
Iraq did not become a US ally after we overthrew Saddam. Does the professor consider that mission successful?
For the moment, it looks as though Trump is drawing a different lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq-
Go in, slap them around with a limited goal, and see if the political order that remains can
a) survive
b) maintain order
c) refrain from again antagonizing the US, at least to the same degree
This approach, rejected in Afghanistan, needs to at least be tried. Both this and aggressive nation building have been tried in the past. Both have succeeded, and both have failed. But both are always options. In Afghanistan, what Trump is doing here is what should have happened. We literally only wanted them to not host al Qaida.
A country like Venezuela has far more institutions than Afghanistan ever had, and not ground down to powder as much or for as long as in Iraq, which paradoxically means it has more to build on, but also more robust traditions to resist thorough outside remaking.
Germany and Japan had them, too, but the US defeated those countries far more thoroughly and destructively in wars of unsurpassed scale and ferocity. These conditions are unlikely to reappear soon.