What’s Wrong With a Quid Pro Quo?

by Hugh Fitzgerald

Jonathan Tobin, the editor of JNS.org, replies to critics of the Morocco-Israel deal who complain about it being a crass “quid pro quo.” His report is here: “In praise of diplomatic quid pro quos,” December 14, 2020:

The news was greeted with jubilation by friends of Israel and the approximately 1 million Israelis who trace their roots back to Morocco. An agreement announced last week by the White House made Morocco the fourth Muslim country in the last few months to agree to normalize relations with Israel. For Israelis and those who care about the way the boycotts and long siege of the Jewish state have fallen apart, it’s a welcome step. Along with the accords signed with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, transforming the already warm under-the-table relationship with the North African kingdom into a permanent and public relationship is more than good for Israel. It not only strengthens the stability of the region, it serves as a major blow to rogue Islamist nations like Iran, and its terrorist proxies and allies, and constitutes another diplomatic triumph for the Trump administration in its last months in office.

But for President Donald Trump’s critics, the prospect of his imminent departure from the White House has not moderated their unwillingness to reject anything he does as wrong, no matter how right it might be. Thus, the reaction to the agreement with Morocco from the foreign-policy establishment and many liberal pundits was dismay rather than happiness about another development that disproved the belief that Israel would never have normal relations with the Arab world until it somehow satisfied Palestinian ambitions. Which is to say that short of Israel agreeing to its own destruction, it would never happen.

This is not just resentment from Obama administration veterans like former Secretary of State John Kerry who were exposed as incompetent. Kerry’s infamous 2016 prediction that normalization would never happen should never be forgotten and remains a testament to the stubborn foolishness of three decades of American diplomats and foreign-policy experts who believed that the only way to peace was by appeasing the Palestinians and pressuring Israel. The return to power of individuals who subscribed to this idiocy in the incoming Biden administration probably means that the United States will not be helping to facilitate more such agreements.

Or it may not be out of the question that some of those who once insisted, like John Kerry, that normalization of ties between Israel and Arab states could only come after the creation of a Palestinian state, will have been chastened by the last few months that have proven them so wrong, and having recognized this new reality that they once said was impossible, they may be willing to promote more such agreements.

But the common thread throughout a blizzard of negative commentary and Twitter contempt for normalization between Morocco and Israel was something different. The critique of the agreement was that it was a crude “quid pro quo” that should not be confused with progress towards peace. Even worse, some denounced the deal for shortchanging American interests in favor of those of Israel. Arguments about Jewish manipulation of U.S. foreign policy have become increasingly legitimized in the last few years. However, in this case, it’s not just anti-Semitic radicals like Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.) using them. Instead, it’s become a theme taken up by otherwise respectable liberal journalists, newspapers like The Washington Post, websites like Bloomberg news or think tanks like the Atlantic Council.

Part of the problem is that the phrase “quid pro quo” has become something of a term of abuse since the Democrats used it as the main argument for their partisan attempt to impeach Trump last winter over his talk with the president of Ukraine. Hence, the mere use of the term to describe the arrangement was a signal to liberals on Twitter that normalization between Morocco and Israel had to be a bad thing.

This is absurd. After all, all agreements between nations are rooted in self-interest, even if the ultimate goal is altruistic.

The history of international agreements is very largely one of “quid pro quo.” Each member of NATO commits to coming to the defense of other members of the group, who in turn have committed to coming to the defense of that member. Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt, giving up the Sinai in exchange for Cairo’s commitment to a peace treaty. The U.S. signs endless trade deals with other countries, giving preferential treatment to the goods of those states that do the same for American products. The entire system of international agreements is based on what states give, and what they get, in return. Yet, as Tobin says, some critics of the Morocco deal criticize its “quid pro quo” essence. But why? The U.A.E. had the same kind of deal with Israel. In exchange for normalization of ties, Israel agreed to “suspend” its extension of sovereignty over part of the West Bank, and not to oppose the sale of F-35s to the U.A.E. Had this “quid pro quo” not been offered, there would have been no normalization. Given the amazing flourishing of business ties in just the first few months, between the U.A.E. and Israel, and the human ties, too, that have resulted, wasn’t that quid-pro-quo arrangement worth it?

In the case of Morocco, as with the other three nations that have normalized relations with Israel recently, the North African country was being asked to stick its neck out and risk the inevitable abuse from Islamists and their left-wing allies that comes with giving up support for the Palestinians’ futile century-old war against Zionism. Even more to the point, it makes the kingdom more of a target for terrorism.

Morocco’s normalization of ties with Israel came at a cost. Few Moroccans – unlike the Emiratis — approved of the normalization, which meant it was important for King Muhammad VI to achieve a diplomatic success, something that could be shown to his people as a major achievement. And he did: he obtained American recognition of the Western Sahara as belonging to Morocco. That has been the chief goal of Moroccan foreign policy for more than four decades.

This is being represented by Trump’s critics as a grievous concession to tyranny and imperialism, as well as an insult to the United Nations. It’s also a recognition of reality. The territory—approximately the size of Britain—is a sparsely populated strip of desert adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean that used to be owned by Spain. When that former imperial power gave it up in 1975 once Spain embraced democracy after the death of dictator Francisco Franco, Morocco staked a claim to land that they considered had been stolen by Europeans. It was opposed by a small nationalist movement called the Polisario that, with the help of Algeria, waged a bloody and unsuccessful war against Morocco for 16 years before agreeing to a ceasefire in 1991. That left Morocco in charge of almost the entire country….

The claims by Trump’s critics about his supposed concession to Moroccan “tyranny and imperialism” ring hollow. Morocco’s monarchy is relatively benign, certainly when compared to the Algerian regime which supports the Polisario movement in the Western Sahara. The Western Sahara has fewer than 600,000 people and cannot possibly survive as an independent state. The choice is between it becoming part of the Western-leaning Morocco or of it becoming part of the despotic police-state in Algeria, run by a self-perpetuating military junta.

In recognizing Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara, the Trump administration has recognized that Morocco — which already controls almost all of that territory – is never going to surrender it. The Americans have simply recognized a reality, and one that favors the West, given Morocco’s privileging its ties to America and France. The Polisario Front, which has just renewed its war with Morocco, hopes to take over the Western Sahara; it is supported, tellingly, by Algeria, which in turn is supported by the likes of Cuba, Venezuela, and the Palestinians. Unlike Morocco, none of these are friends of the west.

The Trump administration, unlike its predecessors, believed that some Arab states were ready to promote their own national interests even if that meant ignoring the demands of the Palestinians. These states were showing signs of no longer regarding the Palestinian issue as central to the Arabs; some clearly had tired of the constant Palestinian requests for diplomatic and financial aid. The Gulf Sunni states had further recognized the value of cooperation on security matters with Israel against the shared menace of Iran, which then led several of them – the U.A.E., Bahrain — to the recognition that the Jewish state had much to offer them in economic development as well.

The transactional approach – you get something, I get something in return – the quid pro quo, is not to be despised. It has made possible the normalization agreements that Israel has recently made with four Arab states. Appeals to abstractions, to “justice” or “fairness,” do little in such matters, but the offer of a concrete benefit can work, and indeed just has worked — with the U.A.E., Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco — wonders.

First published in Jihad Watch.

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