It’s the numbers

By Sammy Stein

Despite the end of the main phase of the Gaza war in October 2025 and the ceasefire that followed the agreement between Israel and Hamas, many anti-Israel organisations, sections of the United Nations and a number of governments continue to accuse Israel of committing genocide in Gaza.

Genocide is the gravest crime recognised under international law. It is therefore an allegation that demands the highest standard of proof. It cannot be established simply by casualty figures, the scale of destruction or political rhetoric. The legal question is whether there is evidence that Israel intended to destroy, in whole or in part, the Palestinian people in Gaza as a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

That requirement is set out in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which defines genocide as certain prohibited acts committed with the specific intent to destroy a protected group as such. This distinction is fundamental. Genocide is not a synonym for a devastating war, nor is it established simply because large numbers of civilians have been killed.

Unfortunately, many of the organisations making the accusation appear either to misunderstand, or to ignore, this essential legal requirement.

A striking example is the recent resolution adopted by the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), widely described in media reports as “the world’s leading association of genocide scholars”. Headlines repeatedly invited readers to accept that “experts” had concluded Israel was committing genocide, as though this settled the issue.

A closer examination tells a very different story.

Although the IAGS announced that 86 per cent of participating members supported the resolution, only around 28 per cent of the Association’s membership voted at all. In reality, approximately one-fifth of the total membership voted in favour. An astonishing three-quarters of members did not participate. Yet the outcome was presented publicly as representing the definitive view of genocide experts.

More importantly, the resolution itself failed to demonstrate the very element that distinguishes genocide from every other international crime. That of specific intent.

Instead of establishing that Israel intended to destroy the Palestinian population as such, the resolution relied largely on selective quotations, statements by third parties and conclusions reached by activist organisations. It made little attempt to address alternative explanations for civilian casualties arising from the realities of urban warfare against Hamas.

Most remarkably, it gave virtually no consideration to Hamas’s conduct throughout the conflict.

It is now widely recognised that Hamas systematically embedded its military infrastructure within densely populated civilian areas, including hospitals, schools, mosques and residential neighbourhoods, while preventing or discouraging civilians from leaving combat zones. These actions constituted serious violations of international humanitarian law and dramatically complicated military operations. These are critically relevant when assessing both civilian casualties and allegations of genocidal intent. Yet they received little meaningful consideration in the IAGS resolution.

The resolution also misrepresented the proceedings before the International Court of Justice by implying that the Court had found Israel to be plausibly committing genocide. In reality, the Court made no such finding. As former ICJ President Judge Joan Donoghue subsequently explained in an interview on the BBC, the Court found only that the Palestinians possess plausible rights under the Genocide Convention requiring protection while the case proceeds. It did not determine that genocide was plausible or likely.

These shortcomings raise legitimate questions about the authority that many commentators have attributed to the resolution. Appeals to “expert opinion” cannot substitute for careful legal analysis, particularly when the legal definition of genocide itself has not been properly applied.

The available evidence presents significant difficulties for those alleging genocidal intent.

Before the war, Gaza’s population stood at approximately 2.2 to 2.3 million people. Although the conflict has caused immense destruction and the tragic loss of many thousands of lives, Gaza’s population has not undergone the catastrophic collapse that one would reasonably expect if there had been a deliberate attempt to physically destroy the population itself.

Israel possesses overwhelming military superiority and unquestionably has the capability to inflict casualties on a vastly greater scale than those that have occurred. Military capability alone does not determine intent, but it is a relevant factor when assessing whether the available evidence supports the allegation. If the destruction of Gaza’s civilian population had truly been Israel’s objective, one would reasonably expect the demographic consequences to have been dramatically different.

Intent is determined not only by statements but also by conduct and by evidence.

Throughout the conflict, Israel repeatedly issued evacuation orders, sent text messages and recorded telephone warnings, dropped warning leaflets, established humanitarian corridors and, on numerous occasions, paused military operations to facilitate civilian movement and humanitarian aid. Whether these measures were always successful is open to debate, but they are difficult to reconcile with an intention to destroy the civilian population. A military seeking to maximise civilian deaths would not ordinarily warn civilians where attacks were planned or repeatedly encourage them to evacuate.

Israel has consistently maintained that its military objective has been the defeat of Hamas, the destruction of its military infrastructure and the return of the hostages abducted on 7 October 2023. Whether individual military operations complied fully with international humanitarian law is a separate legal question. Allegations of war crimes, disproportionate force or unlawful attacks are distinct from allegations of genocide and require different legal tests.

Ultimately, allegations of genocide are determined by examining the totality of the evidence. No single factor is decisive. Population statistics, military capability, casualty figures, operational conduct, official statements and the wider context must all be assessed together to determine whether the specific intent required by the Genocide Convention has been established.

To date, no international court has concluded that Israel committed genocide in Gaza.

The allegation therefore remains nothing more than an allegation. When the available evidence is examined objectively, including Gaza’s demographic reality, Israel’s military capability, the extensive precautions taken to reduce civilian casualties, Hamas’s unlawful military strategy and Israel’s stated war aims, many legal scholars, military experts and governments conclude that the evidence does not establish the specific genocidal intent required under international law.

Genocide is a uniquely grave accusation. It should be determined by courts applying established legal principles and objective evidence, not by political campaigns, appeals to authority or repeated assertions. The burden of proving genocidal intent rests with those making the accusation. To date, that burden has not been met and the proof has not been presented before any international court.